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ABSTRACT 
Akman (2017) argued that our logic textbooks should be burned, since they present a 
propositional analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions that leads to a contradiction. 
According to Akman, we should instead adopt a first-order analysis where conditions are 
interpreted as one-place predicates. I will argue that (1) Akman’s argument fails to show that 
the propositional analysis of conditions leads to a contradiction, since the negation of a 
conjunction is not a conjunction with negated conjuncts, but rather a disjunction with negated 
disjuncts; (2) we can still infer a contradiction from the propositional analysis of conditions 
by negating two propositions individually and using them to form a conjunction that is 
contradictory; (3) Akman’s interpretation of the first-order analysis does not accurately 
represent most attributions of conditions; (4) a proper representation of most attributions of 
conditions in the first-order analysis also implies a contradiction; (5) the propositional and the 
first-order analysis of conditions imply a contradiction because they use the material 
conditional, but they can be formulated with other conditional connectives that prevent this 
consequence; (6) we should still maintain the material conditional in both analyses and 
explain away its counter-intuitive character as the result of an epistemic bias that favours 
intentional evidence over extensional evidence, and acceptability conditions and criteria of 
truth over truth conditions. 
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1. THERE IS SOMETHING PARADOXICAL IN OUR LOGIC TEXTBOOKS  
The propositional analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions that is used in most logic 
textbooks translates the proposition ‘A is sufficient for B’ as a conditional ‘if A, then B’, 
which is represented symbolically as the material conditional, A ⊃  B. The proposition 
expressed by ‘A is necessary for B’ is then interpreted as ‘if not A, then not B’, which can be 
symbolised as ¬A ⊃  ¬B, which on its turn is equivalent to B ⊃  A. These two assumptions 
imply that the proposition ‘A is necessary and sufficient for B’ should be represented 
symbolically as (B ⊃ A)&(A ⊃ B). Now, suppose that one asserts ‘A is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for B’. According to Akman, this proposition amounts to the acceptance of both ‘A 
is not necessary for B’ and ‘A is not sufficient for B’, which according to the propositional 
analysis is equivalent to ¬(B ⊃ A)&¬(A ⊃ B). This proposition is a contradiction in classical 
logic, but since it is obvious that one could deny that A is either necessary or sufficient for B 
without implying a contradiction, the propositional analysis of conditions is surely false .  1
This argument has a flaw. It assumes that the proposition ‘A is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for B’ should be represented symbolically as ¬(B ⊃  A)&¬(A ⊃  B). That this 
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interpretation is incorrect becomes clear once we consider that ‘A is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for B’ is the negation of ‘A is necessary and sufficient for B’, which is represented 
symbolically as (B ⊃ A)&(A ⊃ B). But the negation of this proposition is not ¬(B ⊃ A)&¬(A 
⊃ B), but ¬(B ⊃ A) v ¬(A ⊃ B), and this is not a contradiction in classical logic. Of course, we 
can still infer a contradiction from the propositional analysis in a slightly different way. Let 
us suppose that both propositions ‘A is not a necessary condition for B’ and ‘A is not a 
sufficient condition for B’ are accepted by the same person. Their joint acceptance is 
represented symbolically as ¬(B ⊃ A)&¬(A ⊃ B), which again is a contradiction in classical 
logic. 
This surprising result is a consequence of the truth conditions of the material conditional. 
The negation of A ⊃  B is logically equivalent to A&¬B, while the negation of B ⊃  A is 
logically equivalent to B&¬A. The joint acceptance of A&¬B and B&¬A is obviously a 
contradiction, since it is tantamount to accept both A&¬A and B&¬B. However, it seems 
obvious that one can accept that A is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for B 
without a contradiction. This theoretical shock happens because the negation of the material 
conditional forces the denier to accept that the antecedent is true and the consequent is false, 
but intuitively we can deny a natural language conditional without making commitments to 
the truth values of its antecedent and consequent. For example, if we interpret natural 
language conditionals as material, the negation of ‘If God exists then the prayers of evil men 
will be answered’ implies ‘God exists and the prayers of evil men will not be answered’ . 2
Thus, from the negation of a simple conditional I can prove that God exists. This is 
implausible because one could refuse the conditional based on assumptions about the 
supposed moral properties and dispositions of God even if she does not believe in the 
existence of God. It seems that in this example the denial of the conditional ‘If God exists 
then the prayers of evil men will be answered’ does not imply a conjunction, but a different 
conditional with a negated consequent, namely, ‘If God exists then the prayers of evil men 
will not be answered’, whose acceptance does not require any commitment to the truth values 
of either antecedent or consequent.  
Akman neglects this counter-intuitive aspect of the material conditional. Instead, he 
attempts to prevent the contradiction by adopting a first-order analysis where conditions are 
interpreted as one-place predicates. In his favoured solution, a statement such as ‘A is a 
sufficient condition for B’ should be interpreted as ‘everything that possesses the property A 
possess the property B’, which is then represented symbolically as ∀x(Ax ⊃  Bx). The 
statement ‘A is a necessary condition for B’ should be interpreted as ‘nothing possesses the 
property B if it does not possess the property A’, which is represented symbolically as ∀x(Bx 
⊃ Ax). The idea is that this would prevent the generation of a contradiction since the negation 
of both claims will be logically equivalent to ¬(∀x(Ax ⊃ Bx) v ∀x(Bx ⊃ Ax)), which is not a 
contradiction in classical logic . 3
This first-order analysis of conditions is a move in the right direction. It provides a more 
fine-grained analysis of conditions with an elegant use of predicate logic. It clarifies our 
intuitions by interpreting conditions as properties, and explaining the sufficiency and 
necessity in conditionality statements as inference relations. However, Akman’s use of 
predicate logic does not accurately represent most attributions of conditions. Akman assumes 
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that every conditionality statement involves the use of universal quantifiers, but most 
attributions of conditions do not work that way. Suppose that I assert ‘Socrates being a 
philosopher is a sufficient condition for Socrates being Greek’. Following Akman’s solution, 
this statement must then be interpreted as ‘Everything that possesses the property of being 
philosopher, possesses the property of being Greek’, but this interpretation is too strong, for it 
seems obvious that I was making an attribution of condition that is specific to Socrates. In a 
more sensible formulation of the first-order analysis, this statement should be interpreted as 
‘If Socrates possesses the property of being philosopher, he possesses the property of being 
Greek’, which must be represented without a universal quantifier, i.e., as Aa ⊃ Ba.  
This qualification is also important because it shows that the first-order analysis also 
makes use of the negation of the material conditional and thus it is still unsuccessful in its 
attempt to prevent contradictions. Suppose that I claim both ‘Socrates being a philosopher is 
not a sufficient condition for being Greek’ and ‘Socrates being a philosopher is not a 
necessary condition for being Greek’. Taken together these statements will be equivalent to 
¬(Aa ⊃  Ba) ⊃  ¬(Ba ⊃  Aa), and thus leading us to (Aa&¬Ba)&(Ba&¬Aa), which is a 
contradiction. 
This is not a surprise. If we consider the way in which conditionals and conditionality 
statements are related, it becomes obvious that it was not the propositional analysis, but the 
truth conditions of negated material conditionals that was responsible for the contradiction. 
First, let us consider the way in which conditionals and conditionality are connected. Suppose 
that A ⊃ B is true; given the truth conditions of the material conditional, it follows that if A is 
true, B must be true. In other words, A must be a sufficient condition for B. Now, suppose that 
B ⊃  A is true; given the truth conditions of the material conditional, it follows that if A is 
false, B must be false, i.e., A is a necessary condition of B. Now, let the natural language 
conditional be represented as A → B. If we replace the material conditional for the natural 
language conditional, we can still maintain the rationale that motivates the propositional 
analysis of conditions. For if A → B is true, it follows that if A is true, B must be true, i.e., 
that A is a sufficient condition for B, while if B → A is true, it follows that if A is false, B 
must be false, i.e., that A is a necessary condition for B. If we employ this natural language 
conditional in our propositional analysis of conditions, the propositions ‘A is not a sufficient 
condition for B’ and ‘A is not a necessary condition for B’ should be interpreted as ¬(A → B) 
and ¬(B → A), respectively, which on its turn implies A → ¬B and B → ¬A. But notice that 
their conjunction does not generate a contradiction. If we employ A → ¬B on a modus 
ponens, we can infer ¬B from A, but then B → ¬A will only allows us to infer infer ¬B from A 
by modus tollens. On the other hand, if we employ B → ¬A on a modus ponens, we can infer 
¬A from B, but then we only employ A → ¬B on a modus tollens and infer ¬A from B. But 
there is no circumstance where we can infer both A and ¬A or B and ¬B. The same reasoning 
holds for the first-order analysis, the only difference being that instead of interpreting A → 
¬B as the consequence of ¬(A → B), and B → ¬A as the consequence of ¬(B → A), we 
interpret Aa → ¬Ba as the consequence of ¬(Aa → Ba), and Ba → ¬Aa as the consequence of 
¬(Ba → Aa). 
Since the material conditional is to blame for the embarrassment of an unexpected 
contradiction, one could suggest that we should abandon the classical logic for an alternative 
logic that has a conditional connective that is more in accord with our intuitions associated 
with negated conditionals. That would be a hasty conclusion, however, for there are 
independent reasons to accept this strange feature of classical logic. 
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2. WHY OUR LOGIC TEXTBOOKS SHOULD BE PARADOXICAL 
One could try to dismiss this problem by arguing that our common intuitions about the 
negation of conditionals is just one among other confusions about the negation of complex 
propositions. For example, a common confusion is to assume that the negation of a 
conjunction is another conjunction with negated conjuncts, e.g., the negation of A&B is 
¬A&¬B. But this is a mistake, since the negation of A&B is actually a disjunction with the 
form ¬A ∨ ¬B. Following the same line of reasoning, it could be argued that the view that the 
negation of A → B is A → ¬B is also a mistake, since the negation of the conditional is not 
another conditional with a negated consequent, but a conjunction with the form A&¬B. The 
problem, however, is that it seems obvious after careful consideration that the negation of 
A&B is ¬A ∨ ¬B, instead of ¬A&¬B. This is something that follows from the truth conditions 
of the conjunction. But the fact that the negation of A → B is A&¬B imposes a commitment 
to the truth values of A and B that is still implausible after a second thought, since it is 
intuitively obvious that one can deny a conditional without knowing the truth values of A and 
B. 
However, this intuition about negated conditionals is not sacrosanct. In fact, it reveals 
itself as epistemic bias that favours intensional evidence over extensional evidence . 4
Intensional evidence is any reason to accept a proposition that is not the truth value of the 
proposition, whereas extensional evidence is any reason to accept a proposition that involves 
the truth value of the proposition. That the weather forecast for tomorrow indicates heavy 
rain is an intensional evidence to think that there will be heavy rain on May 6, while the 
occurrence of heavy rain in May 6 constitutes an extensional evidence to accept that there is 
heavy rain on May 6. The fact that some trustworthy individual told me that the last match 
was cancelled is an intensional evidence to think that the last match was cancelled, while the 
fact itself that match was cancelled is an extensional evidence to think that the match was 
cancelled. 
The distinction between intensional evidence and extensional evidence can be extended to 
complex propositions. Intensional evidence is any reason to accept a complex proposition 
that is not the truth value of the proposition, or the truth value of its propositional contents. 
For example, the fact that there is a known connection between red spots and measles is an 
intensional evidence to accept the conditional ‘if Socrates has red spots, he has measles’. 
Extensional evidence is any reason to accept a proposition that involves the truth value of the 
proposition, or the truth values of its propositional contents, e.g., knowing that Socrates has 
both red spots and measles is an extensional evidence to accept the conditional ‘if Socrates 
has red spots, he has measles’. 
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who uses the distinction in a more restricted sense. According to Stevenson (1970: 31), a ‘body of evidence that 
confirms p ⊃ q is intensional just in case it does not confirm the stronger proposition, -p, and does not confirm 
the stronger proposition, q’, whereas extensional evidence is merely nonintensional evidence. The distinction 
used in this article is more comprehensive, since it is not restricted to the material conditional, but also 
encompass any simple or complex proposition. The related argumentation presented in this article involving 
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Now, notice that natural language conditionals, A → B, can be accepted when the speaker 
ignores the truth values of A and B. In fact, in most cases we do not have access to the truth 
values of the antecedent and the consequent of the conditionals that interest us. Besides, when 
we evaluate a conditional we are usually interested in a connection between the antecedent 
and the consequent, and the use of intensional evidence is more informative to establish this 
connection. Finally, the only way of showing that the premise of a modus ponens or a modus 
tollens are confirmed without circular reasoning is to use intensional evidence that confirms 
the first premise . No matter how we look at it, the use intensional evidence has more 5
epistemic relevance than the use of extensional evidence for the evaluation of natural 
language conditionals.  
This intensional feature of A → B is in stark contrast with the use of A ⊃  B, which is a 
truth-function whose acceptance involves the assumption of the truth values of A and B, i.e., 
extensional evidence. If A → B is to be interpreted as having the same truth conditions of the 
material conditional, its acceptance will require knowledge of the truth values of A and B, i.e., 
it will require extensional evidence. In other words, what classical logic tell us about the truth 
conditions of conditionals involves knowledge of the truth values of the propositional 
constituents, i.e., it requires extensional evidence. This flies in the face of our epistemic 
practice during the evaluation of conditionals, which often involves ignorance about the truth 
values of its propositional constituents and the use of intensional evidence. 
This tension between a logical demand for extensional evidence and our epistemic 
constraints tied to the use of intensional evidence is the reason why the negation of the 
material conditional is counter-intuitive, since we can negate conditionals with intensional 
evidence and refuse the logical consequence of this act when it requires extensional evidence. 
In other words, we are not inclined to accept a logical conclusion that requires extensional 
evidence that was inferred from a proposition that was based on intensional evidence. Since 
we are naturally inclined to favour our epistemic practice that relies on intensional evidence 
for the most part, we are prone to reject classical logic and its demand for extensional 
evidence. We have an epistemic bias for intensional evidence that is at odds with classical 
logic. Thus, any attempt to defend classical logic in the face of our epistemic bias for 
intensional evidence will have to deny the logical significance of intensional evidence.  
One way to deny the logical significance of intensional evidence is by observing the 
contrast of the defeasible character of intensional evidence with the conclusive aspect of 
extensional evidence. Intensional evidence is used in a defeasible reasoning that supports the 
proposition, but can be defeated by additional information. The presence of red spots is an 
indicator of measles, but it is possible that a person with red spots does not have measles after 
all. It is just a rash. Extensional evidence is involved in a deductively valid reasoning. It is not 
possible that Socrates had red spots and measles, and still be false that if Socrates has red 
spots, he has measles. The truth of both the antecedent and the consequent represents 
conclusive evidence that the conditional is true. Extensional evidence suffices for the truth of 
a conditional, but intensional evidence only suffices for the acceptability of a conditional, 
since it is not conclusive evidence. 
It is also undeniable that extensional evidence always prevails over intensional evidence. 
Suppose that I assert about a fair coin: ‘If you flip that coin, it will come up heads’. But since 
the coin toss has at least 50% of resulting in tails, there is no intensional evidence to accept 
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the conditional. Consequently, my assertion was unjustified, which induces you to promptly 
deny the conditional. But suppose that after this conditional was asserted, I flipped the coin 
and it came up heads. The result of flipping the coin provides extensional evidence that the 
conditional is not only acceptable, but true. Your negation was a mistake, after all. Now, 
imagine that the conditions were a little different, and that I knew that the coin toss was 
rigged to ensure that the result of the toss will be always heads. Knowing this, I assert: ‘If you 
flip the coin, it will come up heads’. The same conditional would be acceptable in this 
modified circumstance, since now I have intensional evidence to accept it. But suppose that 
despite my excellent intensional evidence the result of the toss turn out to be tails (perhaps 
the rigged mechanism failed, etc.). Again, extensional evidence has the last word on the issue. 
What ultimately determines the truth value of the conditional are the truth values of its 
propositional constituents.  
The predominance of extensional evidence over intensional evidence happens because 
intensional evidence can vary with time and it is based on imperfect information. But if an 
epistemic agent were to correct her beliefs given the opportunity, the optimal information will 
be always extensional, since our intensional based beliefs will ultimately be grounded in facts 
that determine the truth values of the relevant propositions, i.e., extensional evidence. Thus, 
the tension between the appeal to intensional evidence in negated conditionals and its 
classical logical consequences will always be resolved in favour of the later, since the 
intensional evidence will inevitably have to come to terms with the extensional evidence. 
Notice that just as our epistemic biases may favour intensional evidence over extensional 
evidence, they may also favour acceptability conditions, i.e., the conditions where a 
proposition is acceptable or not, over truth conditions, i.e., the conditions where a proposition 
is true or not. The negation of a conditional does not seem to imply a conjunction if we rely 
only on acceptability conditions, but just as intensional evidence is not a proper substitute for 
extensional evidence, acceptability conditions are not a proper substitute for truth conditions. 
We should not confuse claims about what is acceptable or unacceptable with claims about 
what is objectively true or false. One proposition may be acceptable for an epistemic agent 
due to the intensional evidence available and yet be revealed as false; or it could be 
unacceptable due to lack of intensional evidence and it turn out to be true. Considerations 
associated with acceptability conditions cannot be a metric to determine which logic we 
should use because they rely on the vagaries of our epistemic constraints, whereas truth 
conditions are determined by matters of fact that are independent of epistemic agents and 
their epistemic situation. 
Similarly, it would be tempting to argue that natural language conditionals should not be 
interpreted as material since the truth conditions of the material conditional are unsuitable as 
criteria to decide whether a given conditional is true or not. In these cases, we use intensional 
evidence, not a calculus of the truth values of the antecedent and the consequent. But this 
criticism falls in the trap of confusing truth conditions with criteria of truth. Truth conditions 
have logical significance for they determine the conditions in which a proposition is true or 
false, but criteria of truth only have epistemic significance because they are standards used in 
contexts of imperfect information to distinguish whether a given proposition is true or false, 
i.e., in contexts where the only evidence available to asses the relevant proposition is 
intensional. The use of criteria of truth is similar to the use of intensional evidence in the 
sense that it is fallible, e.g., the testimony of experts is a criterion to decide whether I should 
believe in a proposition about a topic that is outside my area of expertise, but is a fallible 
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guide since the experts could be wrong. Truth conditions are the circumstances that determine 
whether a proposition is true or false. Thus, it does not matter that the truth conditions of the 
material conditional are unsuitable as a criterion of truth in contexts of imperfect information 
and scarce extensional evidence, since truth conditions are not criteria of truth and should not 
be judged as such. 
The epistemic bias against the material conditional is also untenable in different way. It 
assumes that the acceptance of a conjunction that follows from the negation of a conditional 
requires extensional evidence, but it is obvious that conjunctions can be accepted on 
intensional grounds. I can accept the proposition ‘The weather tomorrow will be rainy and 
cold’ because I trust in the weather forecast prediction that tomorrow will be rainy and cold. 
In this case, the evidence I used to accept the conjunction is intensional. An intensional-based 
conjunction will only require extensional evidence in the sense that once we accept that the 
conjunction is true, we also make commitments to the truth values of its conjuncts, namely, 
we also accept that both conjuncts are true. But that is very different from saying that a 
conjunction cannot be accepted on intensional grounds. This shows that the contrary intuition 
against the material conditional must be formulated in a different way if it wants to be taken 
seriously.  
The most charitable alternative is to interpret the contrary intuition as a belief that the 
negation of a conditional that is intensional-based does not imply a conjunction that is 
intensional-based. In other words, the rationale of the epistemic bias is not that A&¬B cannot 
be accepted on intensional grounds per se, but that the acceptance of ¬(A → B) on intensional 
grounds does not provide intensional grounds to accept A&¬B. This last resort can also be 
criticised. If the negation of A → B is motivated by intensional evidence, the additional fact 
that classical logic ensures us that A&¬B cannot be false when ¬(A → B) is true is in itself an 
intensional evidence to accept that A&¬B is true, even if the acceptance of ¬(A → B) did not 
involve any direct knowledge about the truth values of A and B. Thus, the fact that classical 
logic allows us to infer a conclusion whose propositional components we ignore is irrelevant 
even on an evidentiary basis. If there is no circumstance where ¬(A → B) is true and A&¬B is 
false, to refuse the conclusion due to evidentiary reasons only shows that reasoners can be 
irrational, not that the conclusion is unjustified.  
Thus, strange as it seems, to accept that any given proposition A is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for B is to accept a contradiction. If we think any different is because we are 
accustomed to epistemic constraints that favour intensional evidence, acceptability conditions 
and criteria of truth. We are biased by our epistemic practices. In this sense, classical logic is 
no different of many scientific findings of physics and biology that also conflict with our 
feelings ‘of what reality ought to be’. What should this bother us? This is just business as 
usual. Let us keep our textbooks safe from the bonfire. 
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